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The shapes of electoral districts determine how votes translate into seats. When districts
favor certain political parties, electoral results can be disproportionate and the public may
lose faith in the political process. Disagreement about appropriate district shapes is sub-
jective, rarely resolved, and often leads to lawsuits. Previously, many authors have called for
objective districting criteria. We offer a novel synthesis of models that enables the proactive
comparison of district maps, by relating a planar graph partition, the single-member plurality
rule, the maximin decision rule, and any agreed measure of partisan bias with a territorial map
and historical vote results. Historical vote totals avoid the complexity and uncertainty
associated with counterfactual models of vote swing. Districting plans could be objectively
compared on such criteria as party proportionality or compact shape to reject plans with
worse bias. Objective tools to reduce partisan bias in district maps could boost collaborative
participation, increase perceptions of fairness and justice, and reduce costs.
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Drawing fair constituency boundaries is an outstandingproblem in political science. First-past-the-post elections,in which different maps create different outcomes for the
same vote, produce partisan bias. Recent problematic cases
include the UK Independence Party, which in 2015 got only 1%
as many Parliamentary seats per vote as the Conservatives, and
the Pakatan Rakyat of Malaysia, which in 2013 took only 40% of
seats despite winning more than half of the total vote. Lopsided
partisan results lead to underrepresented and unhappy citizens,
and may also make electoral competition less important to public
policy, which may weaken democracy.
There is a recent explosion of public and expert interest in district
shaping and gerrymandering (Arnold, 2017). A recent, small
mathematical workshop on the geometry of redistricting drew a
thousand applicants. Increased concern about map drawing has
prompted ever-subtler means of creating biased plans. In response,
scholars have proposed various approaches for crafting fairer plans,
often through automation (Altman, 1997, Bozkaya et al., 2003,
Browdy, 1990, Brunell, 2010, Forrest, 1964, Nagel, 1972, Puppe and
Tasnádi, 2008). Other areas of districting literature concern them-
selves with organizational processes instead of the resulting maps
(Cain, 2011, Cox, 2006), and with the retrospective detection of
unacceptable gerrymanders (Grofman and King, 2007, Stephano-
poulos and McGhee, 2015). High courts must regularly consider not
only the fairness of electoral maps but also whether such matters can
even be suitably resolved in court. Even randomly generated maps
create a partisan bias (Chen et al., 2013).
Unfortunately, the current methods of reducing electoral bias
are inadequate, because district criteria and process interventions
do not address the partisan biases of maps. Therefore, it is critical
to establish clear criteria and measures for electoral fairness.
Below, we present a novel, formal synthesis of models for the
objective identification of fair maps through combinatorial opti-
mization. We provide a formal model for quantifying partisan
effects in hypothetical future elections and an argument for how
citizens could collaborate in its productive use.
Fairness in districting
Fairness is often considered the absence of bias. In competitive
elections, the key bias is a partisan outcome. Observers are
divided over the features of a fair districting plan and over how to
operationalize fairness in a districting process. Some have sug-
gested a great variety of tweaks and schemes to improve fairness.
Others argue that district-based elections work as designed and
are inherently fair.
At the individual level, citizens tend to prefer their current
electoral system, perhaps due to a psychological effect called
system justification wherein individuals are motivated to defend
the status quo (Jost and Hunyady, 2005). This preference is an
example of the is-ought fallacy, whereby individuals infer what
should be from what is, rather than choosing electoral structures
based on social values such as justice.
The debate over district boundaries remains wherever single-
member plurality elections are held. The way district vote aggre-
gation affects results can strike people as unfair and prompt
reform. Citizens in New Zealand adopted a mixed-member pro-
portional system after suffering two electoral inversions in a row.
Elsewhere, numerous regulations and theories have attempted to
improve districting maps.
One strand of representative elections is a majoritarian one in
which the dominant party receives more seats than they have won
votes. Such outcomes may make governments more stable and
more accountable (Powell and Vanberg, 2000, Winer, 2019).
They achieve this by avoiding the coalition governments, typical
under proportional representation, which restrain the options of
party leaders. A preference for majoritarianism parallels one for a
powerful executive.
In contrast, proportionality is a goal that empowers minority
interests. Disproportionality can be considered a key indicator of
partisan bias (Schuck, 1990) and may indicate a tyranny of the
plurality. Therefore, plurality vote aggregation excludes minority
groups (Powell & Vanberg, 2000) and establishes poor electoral
accountability. Since party platforms and individual partisan
identities generally endure, many voters tend to either win or lose
just about every election (Guinier, 1994). The repeat losers are
often ethnic minorities (Stephanopoulos, 2013). Sectarian vio-
lence in the United States, former Yugoslavia, and Northern
Ireland have been blamed on plurality elections and majority
dominance (Emerson, 2016, Fisher, 1863).
Proportionality has other advantages besides minimizing partisan
bias. It provides procedural justice in election outcomes (Dunn,
2012): minority constituencies can form coalitions as needed and so
achieve effective representation (Guinier, 1994). Countries that use it
have desirable social outcomes (Lijphart, 1999) including gender
parity among legislators (Salmond, 2006) and better policy corre-
spondence between voters and representatives (Powell and Vanberg,
2000). Even coalition governments tend to exercise checks and
balances to keep elections fairer (Norris et al., 2016) such that one
party cannot redesign the voting system to favor itself. Finally,
declaring proportionality a goal and achieving it both predict greater
trust in the legislature (Dunn, 2012).
We do not resolve the ongoing debate about what degree of
disproportionality may be considered fair. However, the popular
belief that elections are not fair enough has created a vast body of
jurisprudence and literature. Below, we review interventions for
bias in order to pick an objective goal for more fair districting.
Attempts to reduce bias
Process interventions. Redistricting practices are often opaque
and appear unfair, causing political agitation and legal challenges.
A fair process upholds procedural justice, which is associated with
institutional legitimacy and impacts public satisfaction as much
as elections’ actual outcomes (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Nonpartisan
process reforms include litigation, neutral commissions, adver-
sarial games, and automated districting.
In some territories, losing interest groups file legal suits and
attempt to demonstrate partisan bias. These suits have produced a
notorious regulatory thicket since judges and juries can never
reasonably comprehend all of the factors and compromises which
go into drawing a map of districts. Explaining the individual
aspects of a map—why lines fall in particular places—requires
abstract reasoning, and alleged bias may not be amenable to
resolution through litigation at all (Issacharoff, 2002). The entire
expensive process might be avoided by prior agreement.
Consistent with Rawls’s veil of ignorance, those drawing the
map should have no stake in its political outcome. The staff of
neutral districting commissions is supposed to have no incentive
to introduce partisan bias. However, there are no proven means
of testing this assumption.
The neutral commissions still draw maps with partisan bias
(Lowenstein and Steinberg, 1985) and can also be expensive.
Neutral commissions were adopted in New Zealand in 1887, but
they did not prevent electoral inversions there.
Another option is reliance on a disinterested computer
program. Semi-automated districting software is common, but
despite the expediency and neutrality of such approaches, there
are no territories using fully automated districting. Mexico’s
districting process is more automated than other countries, but its
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opacity does not exclude subjective decisions in district shaping.
The degree of trust in software’s creators is a perennial challenge.
Similar to bipartisan commissions, fair division games (Puppe
and Tasnádi, 2008) can produce “bipartisan gerrymanders” by
formalizing bargaining between two parties. In these games,
deeply invested parties express their preferences turn by turn.
They can alter their own criteria and strategy at any time. There is
no reason to think they will find a suitable compromise or
produce an outcome that meets specific criteria.
Agreeing on the goal of the district is, therefore, more
productive than circumscribing the process. The unambiguous
definition of a single measurable objective is crucial for an
effective plan search. With this guidance, programs can use any
techniques at all to assess possible solutions until a time or
resource limit is reached. An agreed-upon measure of quality and
an objectively best-scoring plan could obviate a districting
commission and lawsuits over compliance.
District result criteria. Traditional districting criteria only reg-
ulate the nature of individual districts. In contrast, more useful
definitions of partisan bias describe the results of elections in
many districts. Criteria such as equal population, communities of
interest (e.g., based on urban boundaries), and compactness are
widely adopted, but unfortunately do not produce fair elections
because they do not measure partisan bias, as explained below.
The idea that all districts should have similar populations is a
common assumption. However, votes are ineffective for a
political minority in a given district. Districts with equal
populations retain geographical bias and produce election results
that may be seen as unfair (Grofman, 1985).
Another popular idea is that districts ought to give identified
social communities their own seats. For example, a community
might hold a social identity that binds it more closely to one
neighbor than another. However, there are no agreed means of
measuring similarity, and all the minority interests dispersed
across the map—seniors, advocates of net neutrality, etc.—get no
representation.
The goal of district compactness also has enduring support,
because it is supposed to prevent districting shenanigans like the
original strangely shaped “Gerrymander” or the intricate modern
maps that connect faraway cities by narrow strips of the roadway.
There is a common assumption that round district shapes are
unbiased, perhaps due to the aesthetic value of circles. Counter-
intuitively, compactness is unrelated to geographical bias, and
increasing it does not increase fairness (Lowenstein and
Steinberg, 1985). While noncompact districts could well signal a
gerrymander, there is no agreement on which of the many
definitions of compactness is most appropriate (Niemi et al.,
1990). Counterintuitively, compactness is unrelated to geogra-
phical bias, and increasing it does not increase fairness (Low-
enstein and Steinberg, 1985). Therefore, compactness is not a
promising criterion to reduce partisan bias.
Some legal criteria are vague or naïve. Other criteria are covert,
such as the protection or sacrifice of particular incumbents.
Adding more criteria is generally counterproductive because that
greatly increases the computational difficulty of reaching existing
goals (Coakley, 2008). In addition, there is no agreement on how
to weigh different goals in redistricting. Reform attention has
therefore turned away from inventing new criteria and is now
focusing on districting processes like the model proposed below.
Party result criteria. Individual district criteria and districting
process interventions are poor proxies for electoral fairness. Tar-
geting a direct measure of fairness across all districts would be more
effective. Researchers advocating such a criterion have called it
“partisan fairness” (Hirsch, 2009) and “gerrymandering in reverse”
(Taylor, 1973). This section describes concepts and measures of bias:
partisan symmetry, competitiveness and responsiveness, losing
voters, the efficiency gap, and party proportionality.
One leading model for electoral fairness is partisan symmetry
(Katz et al., 2020). This principle suggests that two parties should
receive the same number of seats if they receive the same proportion
of the vote. Each party would experience the same bias, if any, as the
competition. The only means to test for symmetry is through
counterfactual votes. Many of these forecasts are of extremely
implausible events, causing a critical missing data problem. The
absence of precedent prevents less likely counterfactual outcomes
from being modeled (King and Zeng, 2006); partisan symmetry can
only be measured when parties could possibly earn each other’s
results (Grofman and King, 2007).
Another indication of partisan symmetry or its absence is given
by the “equal weight” or “vote bias” metric of McDonald and Best
(McDonald and Best, 2015), which greatly resembles the nonpara-
metric skew of the vote distribution. The authors propose the
median and mean votes for a given party as good indicators of both
intentional gerrymandering and human geography. Unfortunately,
correcting the skew for human geography requires a non-existent
collection of neutral districting plans. Further, as this measure
increases with disproportionality, it lacks a unique contribution.
Symmetry standards also reinforce two-party dominance by
excluding other parties from consideration. To our knowledge, no
jurisdiction has banned third parties but denying them representa-
tion in districting is functionally similar. The traditional seat-vote
curve cannot account for the influence of third parties, and because
it is not feasible for minority parties like the Bloc Québécois to win
nationwide majorities, whether their outcomes are symmetric with
those of a larger party is unknowable. In sum, the criterion of
partisan symmetry has distinct disadvantages.
Competitiveness is the idea that minimizing lopsided
elections is desirable, in part because of less competitive
districts' advantage incumbents. Several U.S. states enacted laws
making competitiveness one of their districting criteria.
Increasing the number of competitive districts would award a
bigger bounty to the party winning the most, therefore
increasing majoritarian bias (Buchler, 2007) and unhappy,
losing voters (Brunell, 2010). Maximizing competitiveness
would therefore increase partisan bias. Furthermore, in elections
with more than two parties, it is not clear which parties would
be in competition.
Recent attention has focused on the effectiveness gap between
parties. A single party’s vote efficiency is the ratio of its effective,
seat-winning votes to all its votes (a ratio of one would be
proportional). The gap between two parties’ vote efficiencies is a
measure of geographical bias (Stephanopoulos and McGhee,
2015) and reflects disproportionality. Efficiency gaps are defined
as existing between exactly two parties, so they are only useful in
strict duopolies.
Many authors have called for proportionality or near
proportionality as the desired outcome (Puppe and Tasnádi,
2015, Taylor, 1973). Several measures of proportionality are
available, all independent of the number of parties or seats.
Although previous work claimed that proportionality did not
meet all desired criteria (Taagepera and Grofman, 2003), Koppel
and Diskin demonstrated that a cosine similarity model satisfies
even stricter criteria (Koppel and Diskin, 2009). This model from
the field of information retrieval compares a vector representing
the votes won by each party with one representing their seats, in a
space with as many dimensions as there are parties. The cosine of
the angle between the seat and vote vectors is one in the case of
perfect proportionality. This model is among the best available
measures of partisan electoral bias.
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In sum, many quantitative outcomes are being discussed,
but most have serious flaws or apply only to two-party
legislatures. Here, we propose a novel districting model using
the example objective of party proportionality; the mathe-
matics can be easily adapted to other quantitative goals. In the
next section, we propose a new framework for objectively
comparing district maps.
Model
We present a novel definition of districting criteria to minimize
partisan bias that is suitable for combinatorial optimization. This
system combines the concepts of the planar graph partition, the
single-member plurality election model, a measure of partisan-
ship, the maximin decision rule, a territorial map, and historical
vote results. Our contribution is the synthesis of previous argu-
ments and the proposal that partisan bias is addressed in a
transparent and collaborative manner using an objective model
like the one described.
The act of districting is a k-partition of a planar graph, well
modeled by edge removal. A specific cut set of removed edges,
therefore, defines k districts on the map. Several well-known
heuristics can find weight-balanced, or minimum-cost k-parti-
tions, but since voting behavior cannot be modeled as node
weights we rely on general-purpose metaheuristics. Altman found
that the number of possible partitions amounted to the Stirling
number of the second kind (Altman, 1997), but that formula
enumerates set partitions and so gives an overestimate, mostly
counting patchwork, discontiguous plans. Lawson’s branch-and-
bound method allows an exhaustive enumeration of possible
partitions (Lawson, 2010).
Finding the absolute best plan under any criteria is intractably
hard. Any search among districting plans is then an optimization
problem. Such a search simulates elections in different conditions
to measure the performance of proposed plans. Without
excluding from consideration other strategies, we adopt the
Rawlsian maximin and identify the proposal whose worst per-
formance was least bad.
Partitions are evaluated by their expected political outcomes.
Historical vote data offers a distribution of possible outcomes
that have already happened. By plugging historical results into
proposed maps, the partisanship of hypothetical electoral out-
comes can be assessed. Aggregated votes for current and past
candidates reflect local turnout trends and parties’ enduring
bases of support. In the United States, voting history predicts
future voting even better than declared intentions (Rogers and
Aida, 2014). We suggest using a corpus of recent historical
votes, adjusting as necessary for different election formats. The
set of historical votes should be comprehensive within a certain
period and should include vote swings. Incorporating too many
elections means overfitting to the past and slow adaptation to
new circumstances such as changes in voter demographics.
Conversely, using too few elections risks overfitting to parti-
cular circumstances such as specific candidates. Luckily, vote
results are sufficiently consistent to provide stable estimates
(Linzer, 2012), and in a stabilizing feedback loop, the act of
voting itself serves to reinforce voters’ partisan identities
(Dinas, 2014).
Planar graph partition. M is the map of the territory to be
districted, a connected planar graph. The graph has a set of ter-
ritorial blocks B as nodes, and their adjacencies as edges A. This
model is equivalent to the familiar G= (V, E) form.
M ¼ ðB;AÞ
Every cut set c of removed edges partitions the graph and defines
a set of districts D among the blocks B.




The partition creates districts d, which are disjoint subgraphs.
8ðd; d0Þ 2 D ´D : d ≠ d0; d \ d0 ¼ ;
K is the set of known valid k-cut sets c, each of which disconnects
exactly k subgraphs.
K  fc : jDj ¼ kg
Plurality district election. V is the set of votes cast in B, the set of
all blocks, for P, the set of all parties. An individual vote v sup-
ports party vp in block vb.
8v 2 V ; vb 2 B ^ vp 2 P
Vp is the subset of votes V for party p.
8p 2 P;Vp ¼ fv 2 V : vp ¼ pg
Votes Vd is the subset of votes V from district d.
8d 2 D;Vd ¼ fv 2 V : vb 2 dg
Vdp is the votes for party p cast in district d.
8ðd; pÞ 2 D ´ P;Vdp ¼ Vp \ Vd
Simultaneous district elections. The seat in each district d is won
by some party p and appears in the party’s set of districts won,
Wp. Parties win any districts in which they earn a plurality of
votes. The case of a tie vote is undefined.
8d 2 D; 9p : d 2 Wp^
ð8p0 2 P : p0≠p; jVdpj>jVdp0 jÞ
Cosine measure of proportionality. sp and vp are party p’s seat
and vote shares, compositional variables which always add to one.
A party is proportionally represented when its seat and vote
shares are equal.
8p 2 P; vp ¼
jVpj
jVj ; sp ¼
jWpj
jDj
m is the districting objective applied to an election result with
vote V in districts D. In this step, many objectives are possible.
For example, we define Koppel and Diskin’s cosine measure of
disproportionality.
mðV ;DÞ ¼ ∑ðvpspÞffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
∑vp2∑sp2
q
Maximin decision rule. H is a representative set of recent his-
torical votes V.
H ¼ fV1; ¼ ;Vng
l is the least favorable outcome obtained in election simulations in
district D using votes from H.
l ¼ minðfmðV ;DÞ : V 2 HgÞ
c* is the cut set defining the districting plan whose least favorable
outcome, lc*, is greatest. The case of a tie between plans is
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undefined.
9c 2 K : ð8c0 2 K; c  ≠ c0; lc  >l0cÞ
Collaborative districting
In the previous section, we presented a novel means of comparing
the inherent bias in proposed district maps. Implementation
would be separate from the current paper, whose contribution is
argument synthesis, a formal definition of partisan bias, and
advice about practical implications below. Public participation in
districting has several distinct advantages. First, it can improve
the perceived legitimacy of institutions (Altman and McDonald,
2010) and likely improve perceptions of procedural justice, which
may decrease discontent and legal challenges. Because anyone can
monitor or audit the districting process, the resulting map is more
legitimate. In a virtuous cycle, justice fosters cooperation (Blader
and Tyler, 2013), and the cooperation of the public fosters the
identification of the most just plan. Stakeholders may be less
motivated to resist an outcome based on criteria seen to be fair
(whether proportionality or other criteria). Therefore, wide par-
ticipation in map drawing should be encouraged and enabled.
Parallelized work also helps with large search problems. A
diligent search on a fixed schedule discovers one fairest plan, and
each newly discovered superior plan preempts an older one by
definition. The winners’ motivations and alternatives are irrele-
vant to the judgment of the objective function. Relieving autho-
rities from drawing subjective maps may reduce blame and social
injustice (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001).
An agreed objective function such as the proportionality
standard could also reduce misunderstanding. By transparently
seeking to maximize the agreed function, participants have a safe
harbor from accusations of partisanship or malfeasance. Someone
working in bad faith can produce poor plans, but cannot trick
others into endorsement because their plans are objectively poor.
In sum, it is prohibitively difficult to find a winning plan that also
accomplishes some nefarious end.
Despite early attempts, distributed districting has faltered so
far. The example of Oregon’s 1960 round of legislative districting
is cautionary. Staffers produced a booklet called the “Legislative
Reapportionment Do-It-Yourself Kit” for members of the state
House and Senate, explaining in detail the legal precedents, maps,
and population data to help draw new maps. A districting plan
somewhat underrepresenting the large population of Multnomah
County was passed and signed by the governor, but the State
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional. The plan authors
shared a nuanced understanding of the main goals, but could not
determine in advance whether their map would be considered
valid. Later examples of public participation demonstrated little
institutional transparency and little chance for a submitted map
to be adopted (Altman and McDonald, 2014). A new collabora-
tive model could minimize the need for lawsuits or committee
hearings.
We suggest that a modern kit consists of well-vetted open
source software and data which allows interested users to test and
propose plans of known validity. Data files containing the block
graph and historical votes are necessary for its operation. Cryp-
tographic signatures establish the reliability of the datasets and
the authorship of proposed plans. The kit can generate, refine,
validate, and submit plans. A range of modalities accommodates
the greatest number of participants at little marginal expense:
casual users can use the kit online as a service, and serious users
can introduce search techniques of their own choice. Unlike
commissions convened anew for each redistricting, the kit must
be developed only once, then maintained.
Verifiable design can help maximize quality and public trust.
We suggest that the kit be licensed as open-source (Altman and
McDonald, 2010). Furthermore, its version control system and
issue tracker should be open to the public, policies which tend to
support trust and participation in its development.
Such a kit can use many search strategies; an agnostic approach
was first described by Puppe and Tasnádi (Puppe and Tasnádi,
2015). The random mutation of graph partitions is well known.
We suggest the following metaheuristics to guide development:
simulated annealing (Browdy, 1990) (quantum computers anneal
impressively), tabu search (Bozkaya et al., 2003), genetic algo-
rithms (Chandrasekharam et al., 1993), and parallelized versions
of the same.
Participation can be made appealing and rewarding through
gamification. Those who find good maps could be motivated by
social status and monetary prizes. A nominal fee to deter wasteful
plan submissions could fund the bounties. Those searching can
either work alone or form pools to share risks and rewards.
Public-key cryptography or a blockchain could establish proof of
authorship.
Limitations
This paper explains why an objective method would be valuable,
presents the formulas to calculate partisan bias based on agreed
criteria, and discusses the practical implications of implementa-
tion and effects on public perceptions such as on procedural
justice. The model we propose does not provide a solution for
multi-member districts. Demonstrating the method on historical
vote data or simulations constitutes an effortful software project
and would be valuable in a future paper.
The proposed approach can overfit the district map to past
votes that may include the effects of strategic voting. By defini-
tion, future votes lie outside the sample: their results may not be
as proportional. Monte Carlo sampling of various forecasts could
target a broader set of outcomes, at the cost of including a
complicated model of vote swing.
This model only reflects those past votes represented in the
dataset. One consequence is that new parties are included only
slowly; they must consistently win votes before districts can be
drawn to accommodate them (Brunell, 2010). A 10-year cycle like
that of the United States Census may be too long to represent
shifting voter interests.
Districts drawn without traditional criteria are unlikely to
follow local boundaries, or be compactly shaped or similar in size.
As malapportionment creates bias only when it reinforces geo-
graphical biases (Grofman et al., 1997), population variation
could become more acceptable to voters. However, excessive
variation could bias political advertising towards the less popu-
lous districts. A population floor could ameliorate this problem,
but it is difficult to find consensus on how to balance multiple
criteria.
Non-compact districts designed to empower minorities could
trigger well-founded criticism that some votes are being deliber-
ately wasted. In order to privilege overall fairness in plurality
elections, the interests of many individuals would be sacrificed.
This problem already exists, but maybe perceived as worse if
districts are being explicitly drawn to improve fairness.
Conclusion
We proposed and formalized a direct remedy for electoral bias in
plurality elections. This method serves a social goal and employs
no advanced statistics. It is based on established models but could
be easily modified. Given that districts must be drawn, we prefer
to minimize bias with the objectively least partisan map. This
preferable map can only be found by calculating the bias in many
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simulated elections, a problem well-suited to distributed com-
puting as opposed to humans disputing proposed shapes. Using
agreed criteria to guide map selection in an open, the public
search could improve both electoral fairness and public trust.
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